A Way Out of the Euro Crisis: Fiscal Transfers Are Indispensable for Sustainability in a Union with Heterogeneous Members by Harashima, Taiji
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Way Out of the Euro Crisis: Fiscal
Transfers Are Indispensable for
Sustainability in a Union with
Heterogeneous Members
Taiji Harashima
Kanazawa Seiryo University
2. April 2015
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/63025/
MPRA Paper No. 63025, posted 21. March 2015 06:12 UTC
  
 
A Way Out of the Euro Crisis: 
Fiscal Transfers Are Indispensable for Sustainability 
in a Union with Heterogeneous Members 
 
 
 
 
 
Taiji HARASHIMA
*
 
 
April 2015 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper theoretically examines a way out of the euro crisis based on a model of inflation 
acceleration and differentials. The conclusion is that, unless more advantaged states (e.g., 
Germany) systematically transfer a necessary amount of money to less advantaged states (e.g., 
Greece) in every period, the euro area cannot necessarily reach equilibrium where all 
heterogeneous states achieve optimality. In this case, fiscal transfers are not a tool of 
risk-sharing or a buffer against asymmetric shocks; rather, they are indispensable for escaping 
from indefinite disparity acceleration within a union consisting of heterogeneous member states. 
Such fiscal transfers should not be viewed as alms for the less advantaged states but as a right 
these states should justly assert. The model indicates that the lack of a fiscal transfer mechanism 
inevitably generates inflation differentials and huge current account imbalances among member 
states. As a result, although relatively more advantaged member states obtain “extra” benefits 
from the euro, less advantaged member states eventually lose most of their capital ownership 
and their economies are devastated.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
The euro crisis has been ongoing for several years and appears to be worsening (e.g., Obstfeld, 
2013; Feldstein, 2015). The crisis began with persistent inflation differentials and current 
account imbalances among member states (ECB, 2003, 2007, 2008b; Gros et al., 2005; 
Angeloni and Ehrmann, 2007; de Grauwe, 2009; Decressin and Stavrev, 2009; EC, 2009; 
Fendel and Frenkel, 2009; Holinskia et al., 2010; Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon, 2010; Gregoriou 
et al., 2011). The mechanism that causes these phenomena was examined by Harashima (2011). 
In this paper, I examine a way out of the crisis based on the model proposed in Harashima 
(2011).  
 Since its creation, the euro has been criticized for lacking a unified fiscal authority 
(e.g., ECB, 2008a). Harashima (2011) shows the mechanism for why the lack of a unified fiscal 
authority causes crises. Harashima’s model shows that inflation accelerates if the time 
preference rate of the government is higher than that of the representative household. To 
stabilize inflation, therefore, the government’s time preference rate needs to be controlled by 
delegating monetary policies to an independent central bank. The model in this paper indicates 
that if there is more than one national government but only one central bank (as is the case with 
the euro area), the central bank cannot sufficiently control the time preference rate of each 
member government. Thus, inflation differentials can be generated, and accordingly, current 
account imbalances are widened and fiscal balances are governed by complex non-linear 
processes.  
 The necessity of fiscal transfer has been argued by many researchers, because fiscal 
transfers are a tool of risk-sharing and a buffer against asymmetric shocks among member states 
(e.g., Kenen, 1969; Sala-i-Martin and Sachs, 1992; Kletzer and von Hagen, 2001). Although this 
reasoning is correct, it is a weak incentive in the euro case when trying to persuade more 
advantaged states to introduce a transfer mechanism. The more advantaged states will maintain 
that asymmetric shocks can be dealt with by many other measures and that the moral hazard 
generated as a by-product of the transfer is a much more serious problem. However, the model 
presented in this paper indicates that the transfer mechanism is indispensable for the euro area 
economy to reach equilibrium where all heterogeneous states achieve optimality. That is, 
without the transfer mechanism, the degree of disparity among heterogeneous member states 
accelerates indefinitely. Therefore, the fiscal transfers are not alms for the less advantaged states 
but a right they should justly assert. If the euro is of great value politically, socially, culturally, 
and ideologically and should be maintained, then the transfer mechanism is absolutely 
necessary.  
 
2  THE MODEL 
 
The model used in this paper is the same as that used by Harashima (2011). The details of the 
model are shown in the Appendix. The model indicates that because each member state behaves 
on the basis of its own intrinsic preferences, the law of motion for inflation in member state ρ 
becomes  
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where θG,ρ is the time preference rate of the government of member state ρ, πρ,t is the rate of 
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inflation in member state ρ at time t, N is the number of member states, v, α, μ, ωρ, and  are 
parameters, and 11  tst . Therefore, if 
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for any ρ, inflation does not accelerate in the monetary union (i.e., 0tπ  where πt is the rate of 
inflation in the euro area overall), but otherwise inflation differentials are generated.  
 
3  THE EURO’S FLAW 
 
In this section, I show the consequences if the essential euro scheme is unchanged; that is, I 
examine the mechanism by which inflation differentials and considerable current account 
imbalances are generated and the reasons why the euro fell into a crisis.  
 
3.1  The basic structure 
Suppose a euro-like monetary union consisting of N member states that are identical except for 
time preference. The time preference rate of the representative household in member state ρ is 
θP,ρ. The integrated time preference rate of the representative household of all member states is 
P
N
q
P,q θθN 


1
1 , where θG,ρ,t is the actual time preference rate of the government of member 
state ρ in period t, and the rate is time variable because of control by the central bank of the 
monetary union. The intrinsic time preference rate of the government of member state ρ is 
G,ρθ  
and 
G,ρθ > θP,ρ. The integrated actual time preference rate of all member governments in period t 
is 
G,t
N
q
tG,ρ, θθN 


1
1 . Hence, the central bank of the monetary union needs to set θG,t equal to 
θP to not accelerate the overall rate of inflation in the area of the union. Because θG,t = θP is kept 
by the central bank of the monetary union, each government is expected to adjust its time 
preference rate θG,ρ,t equal to θP. If a government does not sufficiently adjust its θG,ρ,t and sets 
θG,ρ,t > θP, it deviates from the expected behavior; such behavior is called a “deviation” 
hereafter.  
 
3.2  Factors that generate the euro’s flaw 
3.2.1  Adherence to own preferences 
The law of motion for inflation shown in equation (A20) in the Appendix indicates that inflation 
does not accelerate because a government acts in a stupid, foolish, or irrational manner, but 
rather because it behaves quite normally—it adheres to its intrinsic time preference unless an 
independent neutral institution (i.e., a central bank) forces it to stop doing so. However, a 
fundamental question arises. Even if the government is acting quite normally, is this behavior 
rational? In economics, rationality usually means that, given the available information, optimal 
decisions to achieve an objective are taken and rational behavior is generally assumed. However, 
can rational behavior still prevail when a government cannot optimize its behavior to achieve its 
objective? This special situation emerges if the central bank is perfectly independent and is 
firmly determined to stabilize inflation and if, at the same time, the intrinsic time preference rate 
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of government is unchangeable. In this situation, the economy will destabilize and eventually 
collapse, as shown in Section A1 in the Appendix. Therefore, the government cannot achieve its 
objective (i.e., cannot maximize its expected utility) and can only behave irrationally in this case. 
Conversely, if the government wants to optimize its objective and behave rationally, it must 
change its time preference. Clearly, trade-offs between rationality and time preference exist in 
some situations, and either rationality or time preference must be endogenized.  
 Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that people will not optimize their behavior to meet 
their objectives (i.e., maximize utility) if they have complete knowledge of the optimal path. 
Hence, rationality should prevail over preferences, and time preference should be endogenized 
when a clash between rationality and time preference occurs. If time preference is endogenized, 
rational decisions become possible.  
 Even though rationality should eventually prevail over preferences, governments will 
not easily change their own preferences. They will resist endogenizing them and search for 
options to avoid doing so—it is this stubborn nature that drives governments to deviate from the 
path specified by the central bank of the monetary union. Section A1 in the Appendix indicates 
that the inflation problem is equivalent to the deviation problem. The mechanism of inflation 
differentials in the euro area, therefore, must be fully examined considering the driving force of 
deviation.   
 Even though unfavorable consequences are expected if no change is made in this type 
of situation, it can be very difficult to change one’s own preferences. Controlling preferences 
therefore usually requires the help of other people or institutions, which is one of the reasons 
why independent central banks were established to stabilize inflation. Nevertheless, as will be 
examined in the following sections, the question arises as to whether the central bank of the 
monetary union can fully control each member government’s desire to adhere to its own time 
preference rate.  
 
3.2.2  The limited capability of the central bank 
The central bank of a monetary union (e.g., the European Central Bank or ECB) faces a problem 
that most other central banks do not face. There are an infinite number of combinations of θG,ρ,t 
that satisfy 
P
N
q
tG,ρ,G,t θθNθ  


1
1 , but the central bank of the monetary union cannot 
force its member governments to select the combination that it wants them to select. That is, the 
central bank cannot separately control θG,ρ,t, only θG,t collectively.  
 The central bank in a country that is not participating in a monetary union punishes the 
government’s deviation by raising the nominal interest rate by ψ such that ψπθi tG,tt  . 
ttG,t πiθ   (equation [A22] in the Appendix) is not satisfied until the government obeys the 
central bank and lowers θG,t. However, the central bank of the monetary union cannot 
effectively impose ψ separately on each member state; thereby, equation 
ρ,tρ,ttG,ρ, πiθ   can 
be satisfied in a member state even though tG,ρ,θ  PG,t θθ  . Even if a government behaves 
on the basis of its own 
G,ρθ  that is different from θP, the central bank of the monetary union 
can neither punish nor force the government to transition to 
PG,ttG,ρ, θθθ  . As a result, the 
combination of θG,ρ,t is not selected only by the central bank of the monetary union but rather 
through conflict, negotiation, and cooperation among the member governments. Thereby, the 
possibility exists that, at the same time, 
Pρ,tG, θθ   for some member states and Pρ,tG, θ  for 
others, whereas 
PG,t θθ   is maintained. Unlike the case for most central banks, independence 
by itself is not sufficient for a central bank of a monetary union to fully stabilize inflation. 
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3.2.3  Inflation differentials 
Because all member states use the same currency, the price level would be identical across the 
union area by arbitrage if all goods and services were traded freely inside the union area. 
However, not all goods and services are tradable. If anything, the share of non-tradable goods 
and services in the area is large (e.g., Altissimo et al., 2005). Unlike the prices of tradable goods 
and services, those of non-tradable goods and services are not equalized by arbitrage. This price 
heterogeneity indicates that the rate of inflation in each member state can also be heterogeneous, 
and heterogeneous inflation indicates that governments may deviate from the path the central 
bank of the monetary union sets, at least temporarily. Member governments may enjoy periods 
when they behave on the basis of their own intrinsic 
G,ρθ , which is higher than PG,t θθ  .  
 Note that even though inflation is heterogeneous, the marginal product of capital in 
every industry in every member state is kept identical by arbitrage; that is, the marginal return 
on capital is equal to θP, because capital flows freely within the euro area.  
 Because member states can choose to adhere to their own preferences and the central 
bank has limited enforcement capabilities, some member states will deviate from the path the 
central bank of the monetary union sets. By the law of motion for inflation, inflation will 
temporarily accelerate in the deviating member states with relatively high rates of time 
preference, even though, because of the central bank’s control, overall inflation in the euro area 
does not accelerate. Because the deviations should be temporary, inflation acceleration will be 
on a small scale, but non-negligible inflation differentials will be observed. If the correction of 
the deviation is postponed to far future periods after the deviation ends, 
PtG,tG,ρ, θθθ   is 
kept and inflation does not accelerate during the interim period. However, because the deviation 
is left uncorrected, the relatively high rate of inflation continues in the deviating member state 
by the law of motion for inflation, and the inflation differentials thereby continue during this 
period. These features of inflation differentials predicted by the model are basically consistent 
with the observed persistent inflation differentials in the euro area. 
 
3.2.4  Current account imbalances caused by inflation differentials 
Inflation differentials will lead to current account imbalances (e.g., Blanchard, 2007; Arghyrou 
and Chortareas, 2008; EC, 2009). Although inflation rates diverge among the member states, the 
prices of tradable goods and services are still generally equalized across the euro area by 
arbitrage. The equalization is realized by outflows of cheaper tradable goods and services from 
member states with lower inflation to the states with higher inflation. Inflowing goods and 
services eventually will need to be purchased with money from the exporting member states 
(those with lower inflation), because the importing states (those with higher inflation) are not 
obtaining money by exporting either their higher priced tradable goods or their non-tradable 
goods and services. A large part of borrowed money, therefore, is used not for investment but 
for consumption in the higher inflation member states.  
 As a result, the trade and current account balances in member states with higher 
inflation will show continuous deficits: that is, the deviating member states with relatively high 
rates of time preference will show continuous deficits. Accordingly, relatively less competitive 
firms producing tradable goods or services in the deviating member states will disappear more 
rapidly because of the price differentials and the inflows of foreign goods and services. 
Industries providing tradable goods and services will decline, and the share of non-tradable 
goods and services industries will increase in the deviating member states. The features of 
current account imbalances predicted by the model are basically consistent with the observed 
current account imbalances in the euro area.  
 
3.3  Disparity of inflation acceleration among member states 
Because of inflation differentials and a “fixed” exchange rate among member states, relatively 
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more advantaged (i.e. lower time preference rate) states will accumulate more capital than they 
would do if the monetary union (e.g., the euro) was not created. Such “extra” accumulated 
capital owned by the more advantaged states is utilized in less advantaged states because the 
real interest rate is kept equal within the area of the monetary union. More advantaged states 
receive all of the returns to this “extra” capital. As a result, more advantaged states become 
wealthier and less advantaged states become poorer than they would do if the monetary union 
was not created, and the magnitude of the disparity increases as time passes.  
 In theory, all capital will eventually be owned by the most advantaged state. Even the 
second most advantaged state eventually will lose ownership of capital, and extreme wealth and 
income inequality among member states will be generated. In this case, only the most 
advantaged state is better off, and all of the other states are worse off than they would be if the 
monetary union did not exist. Nevertheless, in the initial period after the creation of the 
monetary union, all states may experience an economic boom. Even so, however, the least 
advantaged states will eventually accumulate “extra” debts, and this process will continue 
successively until even the more advantaged states also begin to suffer “extra” debts. The 
magnitude of the suffering will be worst in the least advantaged states. 
 Although only the most advantaged state ultimately benefits from the union, most of 
relatively more advantaged states will enjoy benefits for quite some time after the creation of 
the monetary union. Therefore, in the early periods, most of the relatively more advantaged 
states will support the assertion that a transfer mechanism is an unwholesome, immoral, and 
unjustifiable concept. As time passes, however, and the crisis spreads across these relatively 
more advantaged states, even they may begin to oppose to that assertion.  
 
4  A WAY OUT 
 
4.1  The transfer mechanism 
4.1.1  The two state transfer mechanism 
The model provides us with a way to avoid the crises. It lies in the generation mechanism of 
inflation differentials. Equations (A16) and (A17) in the Appendix indicate that inflation 
differentials are generated by the term 
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If this term is eliminated from equations (A16) and (A17), inflation differentials are eliminated. 
The origin of this term lies in equation (A3) in the Appendix—that is, the budget constraint of 
the government. If additional revenue is added to the budget constraint, however, that term can 
also be eliminated. One example of additional revenue is the transfer of funds from relatively 
advantaged states to less advantaged states.  
 By using equation (A3), the government’s budget constraint in member state ρ can be 
described as   
 
    ρ , tρ , tρ , tρ , tρ , tρ , tρ , t xgπibb   , 
 
where bρ,t, iρ,t, gρ,t, xρ,t, and φρ,t are the real obligation of government ρ to pay for its accumulated 
bonds and the real interest rate for government bonds, the real government expenditure, the real 
tax revenue, and the real amount of seigniorage, respectively, of member state ρ at time t. The 
real rate of interest r is common in member states at steady state. Suppose that there is no 
inflation acceleration and deceleration in the overall union area (i.e., 
PG    and the rate of 
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inflation is kept constant) because the central bank of the monetary union appropriately 
implements monetary policies. Suppose also, for simplicity, that a euro-like monetary union 
consists of two member states (state 1 and 2) that are identical except for their time preference 
rates (
2,1 GG, θθ   and 2,1 PP, θθ  ), and the central bank of the monetary union controls θG,ρ,t so 
as to achieve
PG
G,G, θθ
θθ


2
21 .  
 Suppose also that there is a transfer mechanism such that the government of state 1 
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~  and 
t,t ππ 2
~ . 
 The budget constraint of state 2’s government is therefore  
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Because, by equation (A2) in the Appendix,  
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the optimality conditions of the government of state 2 are, by equation (A16),  
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and by equation (A17),  
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at steady state such that 02 ,tg  and 02 ,tx ; thus, 
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at steady state. By equation (A10) in the Appendix, 
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ρ,tπ
~ is the expected rate of inflation when the transfer mechanism does not exist, by 
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equation (A19) in the Appendix, 
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at steady state. Therefore, by combining equations (1) and (2), 
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at steady state. 
 Equation (3) indicates that, if the transfer mechanism exists, inflation in state 2 (π2,t) 
does not accelerate or decelerate (i.e., π2,t is kept constant).  
 At the same time, the government of state 1 reserves 
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government of state 1 are   
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and thereby  
 
b1,t = b2,t 
 
at steady state. That is, if the government of state 1 transfers an adequate amount of money to 
that of state 2 in any period such that 
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government debts in the same manner. Because of the transfer, the accumulation of government 
debt in state 2 is restrained and that in state 1 is enhanced; thereby, the debts of both 
governments are equalized. As a result, both states do not experience inflation acceleration or 
deceleration: that is, there are no inflation differentials and thereby no current account 
imbalances owing to inflation differentials. 
 
4.1.2  The multi-state transfer mechanism 
The transfer mechanism for two states can be easily extended to a multi-state transfer 
mechanism, but before examining the multi-state transfer mechanism, I examine the case of two 
states that are identical except for time preference and size. In this case, the size (the population) 
of state 1 is twice that of state 2:   
 
  
PG
G,G, θθ
θθ


3
2 21  . 
 
If 



 



     



,t
t
t
s
s
,υ,t,t
t
t
s
s
,υ,t πdsdυπbπdsdυπb 1
1
1
112
1
1
22
~~~~ , then  
 
  
P
,t,t
G,,tG,,t θ
bb
θbθb



21
2211  . 
 
Because 
PG
G,G, θθ
θθ


3
2 21 , 
 
  
212
21
2
1
21
1 2
33
G,G,G,
,t,t
,t
G,
,t,t
,t θθθ
bb
b
θ
bb
b




 ; 
thus,  
 
  b1,t = 2b2,t  . 
 
That is, with the transfer mechanism shown above, two states that are identical except for size 
and time preference accumulate their government debts in the same manner. Both states do not 
experience inflation acceleration or deceleration: that is, there are no inflation differentials and 
thereby no current account imbalances caused by inflation differentials. 
 Next, suppose that a union consists of 3 states (state 1, 2, and 3) that are identical 
except for time preference (their sizes are identical). In this case,  
 
  
PG
G,G,G, θθ
θθθ


3
321  . 
 9 
 
If 



 



     



,t
t
t
s
s
,υ,t,t
t
t
s
s
,υ,t πdsdυπbπdsdυπb 1
1
1
112
1
1
22
~~~~ , the governments of state 1 and 
2 can be seen as a combined government of state 1 + 2 with b1+2,t. If there is a transfer 
mechanism between state 1+2 and state 3 such that  
 
  



 



  





   ,t
t
t
s
s
,υ,t,t
t
t
s
s
,υ,t πdsdυπbπdsdυπb 21
1
1
21213
1
1
33
~~~~  , 
 
then  
 
b1+2,t = 2b3,t 
 
for the same reasons discussed in the previous example. By iterating the same procedures used 
in the above cases, it can be shown that there is a transfer mechanism among H ( N ) member 
states that are identical except for size and time preference, by which government debts in all 
states are accumulated in the same manner and inflation differentials are not generated.  
 With such a multi-state transfer mechanism, member states with 
0~~
1
1
 

ρ,t
t
t
s
s
ρ,υ πdsdυπ  assist and transfer funds to member states with 
0~~
1
1
 

ρ,t
t
t
s
s
ρ,υ πdsdυπ . This mutual aid thereby makes the union sustainable. Conversely, if 
such a transfer mechanism is not established, inflation differentials and current account 
imbalances will be aggravated, and it is likely that a union with heterogeneous members will 
eventually collapse.  
 
4.2  The transfer mechanism is just 
The reason why the transfer mechanism is just can be understood by comparing the 
consequences when the transfer mechanism exists and when it does not. For simplicity, suppose 
the case of two states identical except for time preference—more advantaged state 1 (e.g., 
Germany) and less advantaged state 2 (e.g., Greece)—and suppose that 
2,1 GG, θθ   and 
2,1 PP, θθ  . Suppose also that whether a euro-like monetary union exists or not, sustainable 
heterogeneity is established for both states. Therefore, whether a euro-like monetary union 
exists or not,   
 
 r
θθ PP


2
2,1,  .                             (4) 
 
Finally, assume that the central bank of the monetary union and the central banks of states 1 and 
2 are sufficiently independent from their governments. 
 First, I examine the case where a euro-like monetary union does not exist. In order to 
not accelerate inflation, the central banks of the two states control their governments’ time 
preferences to satisfy  
 
2
2,1,
1,
PP
G
θθ
θ

                              (5) 
 
and 
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2
2,1,
2,
PP
G
θθ
θ

   ,                           (6) 
 
respectively. Both states’ economies stabilize at steady state by equation (4) without inflation 
acceleration, because both central banks keep equations (5) and (6). 
 In the case where a euro-like monetary union is established and it is equipped with the 
transfer mechanism, the central bank of the monetary union controls the overall rate of 
governments’ time preference such that  
 
22
2,1,2,1, PPGG θθθθ 


                           (7) 
 
to not accelerate inflation in the union as a whole. Thanks to the transfer mechanism, inflation in 
both states does not accelerate as shown in Section 4.1. Therefore, both economies stabilize at 
steady state by equation (4) without inflation acceleration, because there is a transfer mechanism 
and the central banks maintain equation (7). The levels of production and consumption in both 
states are the same as in the case where a euro-like monetary union does not exist, because 
equation (4) is identical in both cases, and there is no current account imbalance owing to 
inflation differentials.  
 There is, however, a difference between these two cases. In the latter case, the 
government of member state 2 is not required to lower θG,2 to 
2
2,1, PP
P
θθ
θ

 . Because the 
central bank of the monetary union keeps equation (7) satisfied, both governments reluctantly 
need to lower their rates of time preference. Faced with pressure from the central bank (i.e., it 
raises interest rates), both governments lower their rates of time preference similarly—that is, 
almost at the same rate—because they commonly adhere to their intrinsic time preferences 
unless a third party forces them to stop doing so. They will obey the third party to the same 
degree. As a result, through the actions of the central bank,    
 
 
1,
2,1,2,1,
2,
22
G
PPGG
G θ
θθθθ
θ 



                       (8) 
 
will be always held whether the transfer mechanism exists or not in a euro-like monetary union. 
Therefore, in the latter case, unlike with equations (5) and (6), the government of state 2 does 
not need to lower θG,2 to 
2
2,1, PP θθ   but that of state 1 needs to make θG,1 lower than 
2
2,1, PP θθ  . 
 Inequality (8) means that the government of state 1 practically borrows money, 
replacing the borrowing of the government of state 2 by 



  

,t
t
t
s
s
,υ,t πdsdυπb 2
1
1
22
~~  




   

,t
t
t
s
s
,υ,t πdsdυπb 1
1
1
11
~~ . Through this substitution, the debt increases of the government 
of state 2 are lowered and those of state 1 are raised. In other words, the more advantaged state 
is practically a guarantor for the less advantaged state’s obligations. As a result, imbalances 
among member states are eliminated.  
 Finally, I examine the case where a euro-like monetary union is established but it is 
not equipped with a transfer mechanism. The central bank of the monetary union controls the 
overall rate of governments’ time preference to satisfy equation (7). However, as shown in the 
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model, each state’s inflation cannot be fully controlled individually, and inequality (8) will 
always hold. Because there is no transfer mechanism, inequality (8) indicates that persistent 
inflation differentials are generated and they accelerate. Conversely, the levels of production in 
both states are the same as in the case where a euro-like monetary union does not exist because 
equation (4) is identical in both cases. The levels of consumption, however, differ between the 
two states because of the inflation differentials and the subsequent current account imbalances. 
As a result, the more advantaged state owns more capital than in the case where a euro-like 
monetary union does not exist, and conversely, the less advantaged state owns less. Therefore, 
consumption in state 1 is larger and that in state 2 is smaller than in the case where a euro-like 
monetary union does not exist. If the lack of a transfer mechanism continues, the magnitude of 
this disparity will accelerate as time passes.  
 Without the transfer mechanism, therefore, state 1 obtains “extra” gains because its 
consumption is larger, and state 2 suffers “extra” losses. If the lack of a transfer mechanism 
continues, the degree of disparity between the “extra” gains and losses will be aggravated to an 
extreme degree. Clearly, the transfer mechanism is just.  
 Some people may argue that the transfer mechanism is immoral and unjustifiable 
because the government of state 2 does not need to lower θG,2 to θP, although satisfying equation 
(6) is required when a euro-like monetary union does not exist. It is true that if there is a transfer 
mechanism, the government of state 2 does not need to be as patient as in the case that a 
euro-like monetary union does not exist, but this does not necessarily mean that the transfer 
mechanism is immoral and unjustifiable. Not lowering θG,2 to θP in and of itself does not signify 
profligacy. As argued above, because of the central bank’s control, both governments lower 
their rates of time preference similarly—that is, almost at the same rate—and both governments 
naturally and equally adhere to their intrinsic time preferences. Why, then, should only the 
government of state 2 be condemned for being immoral? Furthermore, a union is formed 
because it is of great value politically, socially, culturally, or ideologically. If a union is 
important and should be maintained from many points of view, the transfer mechanism is 
justified because, with it, no member state enjoys “extra” benefits and no member state suffers 
“extra” losses.  
 The transfer mechanism can be seen as a necessity to achieve a kind of sustainable 
heterogeneity. Introducing the transfer mechanism means that a supranational authority assesses 
taxes on more advantaged member states and distributes the revenue from these taxes to less 
advantaged member states to establish and maintain unity and solidarity in a union consisting of 
heterogeneous member states.  
 
4.3  Existing transfer mechanisms within Germany 
The reason why the transfer mechanism is indispensable for justice in a union with 
heterogeneous members can be better understood by observing Germany's current existing 
intergovernmental transfer system. German municipalities are subject to a comprehensive fiscal 
equalization system: that is, they receive a huge amount of fiscal transfers from the federal and 
state governments. The fiscal equalization transfers in municipal finance in Germany amount to 
more than a quarter of total revenues on average. In addition, the transfer amounts vary greatly 
among municipalities. Municipalities with higher fiscal needs and a lower fiscal capacity can 
receive larger amounts.  
 This fiscal equalization system is usually justified on the grounds of redistribution to 
reduce disparities in fiscal capacity among municipalities and as insurance against asymmetric 
revenue shocks. However, it seems likely that Germans, like people in other nations, empirically 
know that, without appropriate fiscal transfers, a union consisting of heterogeneous members 
will collapse (by the mechanism shown in this paper); therefore, the more advantaged members 
should appropriately assist the less advantaged members. The assistance of less advantaged 
members by more advantaged members is quite reasonable if a union is to be maintained. If a 
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union (e.g., Bundesrepublik Deutschland) is of great value politically, socially, culturally, or 
ideologically and needs transfers to be sustainable, then an appropriate transfer mechanism must 
be established.  
 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The euro crisis is ongoing and appears to be worsening. This paper theoretically examined the 
mechanism behind the crisis and proposed a solution. The model in this paper indicates that the 
essence of the euro’s flaw is the lack of a transfer mechanism among heterogeneous member 
states. Unless, in every period, more advantaged states (e.g., Germany) systematically transfer a 
necessary amount of money to less advantaged states (e.g., Greece), the euro will eventually 
reach an impasse. Although the more advantaged member states obtain “extra” benefits from the 
euro system, less advantaged member states eventually lose most capital ownership and their 
economies are left devastated. This outcome is not a result of profligacy of some member 
states—rather, it stems from different degrees of intrinsic time preference among member states.  
 The necessity of fiscal transfer has been argued by many researchers because fiscal 
transfers are a tool of risk-sharing and a buffer against asymmetric shocks among member states. 
Although this reasoning is correct, it is a weak incentive to persuade more advantaged states to 
introduce a transfer mechanism. However, the model in this paper indicates that a transfer 
mechanism is indispensable for the euro area economy to reach equilibrium where all 
heterogeneous states achieve optimality. That is, without the transfer mechanism, the degree of 
disparity among heterogeneous member states accelerates indefinitely. Therefore, fiscal 
transfers should not be viewed as alms for the less advantaged states but as a right these states 
should justly assert. If the euro system is of great value politically, socially, culturally, and 
ideologically and it is desirable to maintain it from those perspectives, then the transfer 
mechanism is absolutely necessary. 
 Some people may argue that the solution presented in this paper is immoral and 
unjustifiable and generates serious moral hazard, but it is actually quite reasonable. If most 
members of a union with heterogeneous members do not want the union to collapse, the more 
advantaged members will usually help the less advantaged members. With this behavior, a spirit 
of unity and solidarity is established and maintained among the heterogeneous members. The 
model presented in this paper shows the mechanism supporting this statement from the 
perspective of theoretical economics. 
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APPENDIX 
 
A1  The single-country model  
The single-country model is based on the model of inflation by Harashima (2008). The 
single-country model will be extended to a multi-country model in Section A2.  
 
A1.1  The optimal trend inflation 
A1.1.1  The government 
A1.1.1.1  The government budget constraint 
The government budget constraint is 
 
  
tttttt XGiBB 
  , 
 
where Bt is the nominal obligation of the government to pay for its accumulated bonds, it is the 
nominal interest rate for government bonds, Gt is the nominal government expenditure, Xt is the 
nominal tax revenue, and 
t  is the nominal amount of seigniorage at time t. The tax is assumed 
to be lump sum, the government bonds are long term, and the returns on the bonds are realized 
only after the bonds are held during a unit period (e.g., a year). The government bonds are 
redeemed in a unit period, and the government successively refinances the bonds by issuing new 
ones at each time t. Let 
t
t
t
P
B
b  , 
t
t
t
P
G
g  , 
t
t
t
P
X
x  , and 
t
t
t
P

  , where Pt is the price level 
at time t. Let also 
t
t
t
P
P
π

  be the inflation rate at time t. By dividing by Pt, the budget 
constraint is transformed to 
ttttt
t
t xgib
P
B


, which is equivalent to 
 
  tttttttttttttt xgπibπbxgibb    .            (A1) 
 
 Because the returns on government bonds are realized only after holding the bonds 
during a unit period, investors buy the bonds if  dsrπEi
t
t
sstt 


1
 at time t, where 
ti  is 
the nominal interest rate for bonds bought at t and rt is the real interest rate in markets at t. 
Hence, by arbitrage,  dsrπEi
t
t
sstt 


1
 and if rt is constant such that rrt   (i.e., if it is at 
steady state), then 
 
  rdsπEi
t
t
stt  
1
 . 
 
The nominal interest rate rdsπEi
t
t
stt  
1
 means that, during a sufficiently small period 
between t and t + dt, the government’s obligation to pay for the bonds’ return in the future 
increases not by  rπdt t   but by 



 

rdsπEdt
t
t
st
1
. If πt is constant, then t
t
t
st πdsπE 
1
 
and rπi tt  , but if πt is not constant, these equations do not necessarily hold. 
 Since bonds are redeemed in a unit period and successively refinanced, the bonds the 
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government is holding at t have been issued between t - 1 and t. Hence, under perfect foresight, 
the average nominal interest rate for all government bonds at time t is the weighted sum of 
ti  
such that 
 
  rds
dvB
B
dvπds
dvB
B
ii
t
t t
t
tv
ts
s
s
v
t
t t
t
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st 


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

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
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
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 
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
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,
,
1
1
1
,
,  , 
 
where 
tsB ,  is the nominal value of bonds at time t that were issued at time s. If the weights 
 
t
t
tv
ts
dvB
B
1
,
,  between t - 1 and t are not so different from each other, then approximately 
rdsdυπi
t
t
s
s
υt   

1
1
. To be precise, if the absolute values of πs for 11  tst  are 
sufficiently smaller than unity, the differences among the weights are negligible and then 
approximately 
 
rdsdυπi
t
t
s
s
υt   

1
1
                       (A2) 
 
(see Harashima, 2008). The average nominal interest rate for the total government bonds, 
therefore, develops by rdsdυπi
t
t
s
s
υt   

1
1
. If πt is constant, then dsdυπ
t
t
s
s
υ 

1
1
 
tπ ; thus, rπi tt  . If πt is not constant, however, the equations t
t
t
s
s
υ πdsdυπ  

1
1
 
and it = πt + r do not necessarily hold.  
 
A1.1.1.2  An economically Leviathan government  
Under a proportional representation system, the government represents the median household 
whereas the representative household from an economic perspective represents the mean 
household.
1
 Because of this difference, they usually have different preferences. To account for 
this essential difference, a Leviathan government is assumed in the model.
2
 There are two 
extremely different views regarding government’s behavior in the literature on political 
economy: the Leviathan view and the benevolent view (e.g., Downs 1957; Brennan and 
Buchanan 1980; Alesina and Cukierman 1990). From an economic point of view, a benevolent 
government maximizes the expected economic utility of the representative household, but a 
Leviathan government does not. Whereas the expenditure of a benevolent government is a tool 
used to maximize the economic utility of the representative household, the expenditure of a 
Leviathan government is a tool used to achieve the government’s own policy objectives.3 For 
example, if a Leviathan government considers national security to be the most important 
political issue, defense spending will increase greatly, but if improving social welfare is the top 
political priority, spending on social welfare will increase dramatically, even though the 
                                                          
1 See the literature on the median voter theorem (e.g., Downs 1957). Also see the literature on the delay in reforms 
(e.g., Alesina and Drazen 1991; Cukierman et al. 1992). 
2 The most prominent reference to Leviathan governments is Brennan and Buchanan (1980). 
3 The government behavior assumed in the fiscal theory of the price level reflects an aspect of a Leviathan 
government. Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) argue that non-Ricardian policies correspond to the type of policies in 
which governments are viewed as selecting policies and committing themselves to those policies in advance of prices 
being determined in markets. 
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increased expenditures may not necessarily increase the economic utility of the representative 
household. 
 Is it possible, however, for such a Leviathan government to hold office for a long 
period? Yes, because a government is generally chosen by the median of households under a 
proportional representation system (e.g., Downs 1957), whereas the representative household 
usually presumed in the economics literature is the mean household. The economically 
representative household is not usually identical to the politically representative household, and 
a majority of people could support a Leviathan government even if they know that the 
government does not necessarily pursue only the economic objectives of the economically 
representative household. In other words, the Leviathan government argued here is an 
economically Leviathan government that maximizes the political utility of people, whereas the 
conventional economically benevolent government maximizes the economic utility of people. In 
addition, because the politically and economically representative households are different (the 
median and mean households, respectively), the preferences of future governments will also be 
similarly different from those of the mean representative household. In this sense, the current 
and future governments presented in the model can be seen as a combined government that goes 
on indefinitely; that is, the economically Leviathan government always represents the median 
representative household. 
 The Leviathan view generally requires the explicit inclusion of government 
expenditure, tax revenue, or related activities in the government’s political utility function (e.g., 
Edwards and Keen 1996). Because an economically Leviathan government derives political 
utility from expenditure for its political purposes, the larger the expenditure is, the happier the 
Leviathan government will be. But raising tax rates will provoke people’s antipathy, which 
increases the probability of being replaced by the opposing party that also nearly represents the 
median household. Thus, the economically Leviathan government regards taxes as necessary 
costs to obtain freedom of expenditure for its own purposes. The government therefore will 
derive utility from expenditure and disutility from taxes. Expenditure and taxes in the political 
utility function of the government are analogous to consumption and labor hours in the 
economic utility function of the representative household. Consumption and labor hours are 
both control variables, and as such, the government’s expenditure and tax revenue are also 
control variables. As a whole, the political utility function of economically Leviathan 
government can be expressed as uG(gt, xt).
4
 In addition, it can be assumed on the basis of 
previously mentioned arguments that 0

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u
.
5
 An economically Leviathan government therefore maximizes the expected 
sum of these utilities discounted by its time preference rate under the constraint of deficit 
financing. 
 
A1.1.1.3  The optimization problem 
                                                          
4 It is possible to assume that governments are partially benevolent. In this case, the utility function of a government 
can be assumed to be  ttttG l,c,x,gu , where ct is real consumption and lt is the leisure hours of the representative 
household. However, if a lump-sum tax is imposed, the government’s policies do not affect steady-state consumption 
and leisure hours. In this case, the utility function can be assumed to be  ttG x,gu . 
5 Some may argue that it is more likely that 
0


t
G
x
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0
2
2

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
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u . However, the assumption used is not an 
important issue here because    
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x
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x
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x
  at steady state, as will be shown in the solution to 
the optimization problem later in the paper. Thus, the results are not affected by which assumption is used.  
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The optimization problem of an economically Leviathan government is  
 
   dttθ,xguEMax GttG 

exp
0
 
 
subject to the budget constraint 
 
   ttttttt xgπibb   ,                      (A3) 
 
where uG is the constant relative risk aversion utility function of the government, θG is the 
government’s rate of time preference, and E is the expectation operator. All variables are 
expressed in per capita terms, and population is assumed to be constant. The government 
maximizes its expected political utility considering the behavior of the economically 
representative household that is reflected in it in its budget constraint. 
 
A1.1.2  Households 
The economically representative household maximizes its expected economic utility. Sidrauski 
(1967)’s well-known money in the utility function model is used for the optimization problem. 
The representative household maximizes its expected utility 
 
   dttθm,cuE PttP 

exp
0
 
 
subject to the budget constraint 
 
       tttttttttt gmrπcσwara   , 
 
where uP and θP are the utility function and the time preference rate of the representative 
household, ct is real consumption, wt is real wage, σt is lump-sum real government transfers, mt 
is real money, at = kt + mt, and kt is real capital. It is assumed that rt = f’(kt), tw  
   ttt kfkkf  , 0'uP , 0"uP , 
 
0


t
ttP
m
m,cu
, and 
 
0
2
2



t
ttP
m
m,cu
, where  f  is the 
production function. Government expenditure (gt) is an exogenous variable for the 
representative household because it is an economically Leviathan government. It is also 
assumed that, although all households receive transfers from a government in equilibrium, when 
making decisions, each household takes the amount it receives as given, independent of its 
money holdings. Thus, the budget constraint means that the real output  tkf  at any time is 
demanded for the real consumption ct, the real investment tk
 , and the real government 
expenditure gt such that   tttt gkckf   . The representative household maximizes its 
expected economic utility considering the behavior of government reflected in gt in the budget 
constraint. In this discussion, a central bank is not assumed to be independent of the 
government; thus, the functions of the government and the central bank are not separated. This 
assumption can be relaxed, and the roles of the government and the central bank are explicitly 
separated in Section A1.2. 
 Note that the time preference rate of government (θG) is not necessarily identical to 
that of the representative household (θP) because the government and the representative 
household represent different households (i.e., the median and mean households, respectively). 
In addition, the preferences will differ because (1) even though people want to choose a 
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government that has the same time preference rate as the representative household, the rates 
may differ owing to errors in expectations (e.g., Alesina and Cukierman 1990); and (2) current 
voters cannot bind the choices of future voters and, if current voters are aware of this possibility, 
they may vote more myopically as compared with their own rates of impatience in private 
economic activities (e.g., Tabellini and Alesina 1990). Hence, it is highly likely that the time 
preference rates of a government and the representative household are heterogeneous. It should 
be also noted, however, that even though the rates of time preference are heterogeneous, an 
economically Leviathan government behaves based only on its own time preference rate, 
without hesitation. 
 
A1.1.3  The simultaneous optimization 
First, I examine the optimization problem of the representative household. Let Hamiltonian HP 
be       ttttttttttP,PttPP gmrπcσwarλtθm,cuH  exp , where λP,t is a costate 
variable, ct and mt are control variables, and at is a state variable. The optimality conditions for 
the representative household are;  
 
 
  tP,P
t
ttP λtθ
c
m,cu



exp  ,                      (A4) 
 
 
   tttP,P
t
ttP rπλtθ
m
m,cu



exp  ,                   (A5) 
 
ttP,tP, rλλ 
  ,                            (A6) 
 
    tttttttttt gmrπcσwara   ,               (A7) 
 
0lim 
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ttP,
t
aλ  .                           (A8) 
 
By conditions (A4) and (A5), 
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, and by conditions (A4) and 
(A6),  
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

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 .                (A9) 
 
Hence, 
 
θP = rt = r                             (A10) 
 
at steady state such that 0tc  and 0tk
 . 
 Next, I examine the optimization problem of the economically Leviathan government. 
Let Hamiltonian HG be       tttttttG,GttGG xgπibλtθx,guH  exp , where λG,t is a 
costate variable. The optimality conditions for the government are;  
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 
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exp  ,                     (A11) 
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t
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x
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exp  ,                     (A12) 
 
 tttG,tG, πiλλ   ,                          (A13) 
 
  ttttttt xgπibb   ,                     (A14) 
 
0lim 

ttG,
t
bλ  .                           (A15) 
 
Combining conditions (A11), (A12), and (A13) and equation (A2) yields the following 
equations: 
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and  
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Here, 
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steady state such that 0tg  and 0tx ; thus, 
 
t
t
t
s
s
υtG πdsdυπrθ   

1
1
 .                 (A18) 
 
Hence, by equation (A10), 
 
PGt
t
t
s
s
υ θθπdsdυπ  

1
1
                   (A19) 
 
at steady state such that 0tg , 0tx , 0tc , and 0tk
 .6   
 Equation (A19) is a natural consequence of simultaneous optimization by the 
economically Leviathan government and the representative household. If the rates of time 
preference are heterogeneous between them, then 
 
                                                          
6 If and only if 
t
ttt
G
b
xg
θ


 at steady state, then the transversality condition (A15) 0lim 

ttG,
t
bλ  holds. 
The proof is shown in Harashima (2008). 
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t
t
t
s
s
υt πdsdυπri   

1
1
 . 
 
This result might seem surprising because it has been naturally conjectured that it = πt + r. 
However, this is a simple misunderstanding because πt indicates the instantaneous rate of 
inflation at a point such that 
t
t
t
P
P
π

 , whereas dsdυπ
t
t
s
s
υ 

1
1
 roughly indicates the 
average inflation rate in a period. Equation (A19) indicates that πt develops according to the 
integral equation 
PG
t
t
s
s
υt θθdsdυππ   

1
1
. If πt is constant, the equations rπi tt   and 
t
t
t
s
s
υ πdsdυπ  

1
1
 are true. However, if πt is not constant, the equations do not necessarily 
hold. Equation (A19) indicates that the equations rπi tt   and t
t
t
s
s
υ πdsdυπ  

1
1
 
hold only in the case where θG = θP (i.e., a homogeneous rate of time preference). It has been 
previously thought that a homogeneous rate of time preference naturally prevails; thus, the 
equation it = πt + r has not been questioned. As argued previously, however, a homogeneous 
rate of time preference is not usually guaranteed. 
 
A1.1.4  The law of motion for trend inflation 
Equation (A19) indicates that inflation accelerates or decelerates as a result of the government 
and the representative household reconciling the contradiction in heterogeneous rates of time 
preference. If πt is constant, the equation dsdυππ
t
t
s
s
υt  


1
1
 holds; conversely, if tπ  
dsdυπ
t
t
s
s
υ 

1
1
, then πt is not constant. Without the acceleration or deceleration of inflation, 
therefore, equation (A19) cannot hold in an economy in which 
PG θθ  . In other words, it is not 
until 
PG θθ   that inflation can accelerate or decelerate. Heterogeneous time preferences 
(
PG θθ  ) bend the path of inflation and enables inflation to accelerate or decelerate. The 
difference of time preference rates (
PG θθ  ) at each time needs to be transformed to the 
accelerated or decelerated inflation rate πt at each time.  
     Equation (A19) implies that inflation accelerates or decelerates nonlinearly in the case in 
which 
PG θθ  . For a sufficiently small period dt, dttπ 1  is determined with πs  11  tst  
that satisfies 
PGt
t
t
s
s
υ θθπdsdυπ  

1
1
, so as to hold the equation dsdυπ
dtt
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υ 
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dtt
t
s
s
υ ππdsdυπ  
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
 
1
1
1
. A solution of the integral equation (A19) for given θG and 
θP is 
 
  20 6 tθθππ PGt   .                        (A20) 
 
Generally, the path of inflation that satisfies equation (A19) for t0  is expressed as 
 
      tzθθππ tPGt lnexp60   , 
 
where zt is a time dependent variable. The stream of zt is various depending on the boundary 
condition, i.e., the past and present inflation during 01  t  and the path of inflation during 
10  t  that is set to make π0 satisfy equation (A19). However, zt has the following important 
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property. If πt satisfies equation (A19) for t0 , and  tπ  for 11  t , then  
 
  2lim 

t
t
z  . 
 
Proof is shown in Harashima (2008). Any inflation path that satisfies equation (A19) for t0  
therefore asymptotically approaches the path of equation (A20). The mechanism behind the law 
of motion for inflation (equation [A20]) is examined more in detail in Harashima (2008). 
 
A1.2  The central bank 
A central bank manipulates the nominal interest rate according to the following Taylor-type 
instrument rule in the model; 
 
  tx*tπt xγππγγi   ,                     (A21) 
 
where π* is the target rate of inflation and γ , γπ, and γx are constant coefficients. rπγ
*   
as is usually assumed.  
 In Section A1.1, central banks are not explicitly considered because they are not 
assumed to be independent of governments. However, in actuality, central banks are 
independent organizations in most countries even though some of them are not sufficiently 
independent. Furthermore, in the conventional inflation model, it is the central banks that 
control inflation and governments have no role in controlling inflation. Conventional inflation 
models show that the rate of inflation basically converges at the target rate of inflation set by a 
central bank. The target rate of inflation therefore is the key exogenous variable that determines 
the path of inflation in these models.  
     Both the government and the central bank can probably affect the development of 
inflation, but they would do so in different manners, as equation (A20) and conventional 
inflation models indicate. However, the objectives of the government and the central bank may 
not be the same. For example, if trend inflation is added to conventional models by replacing 
their aggregate supply equations with equation (A20), inflation cannot necessarily converge at 
the target rate of inflation because another key exogenous variable (θG) is included in the 
models. A government makes inflation develop consistently with the equation (A20), which 
implies that inflation will not necessarily converge at the target rate of inflation. Conversely, a 
central bank makes inflation converge at the target rate of inflation, which implies that inflation 
will not necessarily develop consistently with equation (A20). That is, unless either θG is 
adjusted to be consistent with the target rate of inflation or the target rate of inflation is adjusted 
to be consistent with θG, the path of inflation cannot necessarily be determined. Either θG or the 
target rate of inflation need be an endogenous variable. If a central bank dominates, the target 
rate of inflation remains as the key exogenous variable and θG should then be an endogenous 
variable. The reverse is also true.  
 A central bank will be regarded as truly independent if θG is forced to be adjusted to 
the one that is consistent with the target rate of inflation set by the central bank. For example, 
suppose that 
PG θθ   and a truly independent central bank manipulates the nominal interest 
rate according to the Taylor-type instrument rule (equation [A21]). Here, 
 
tG
t
t
s
s
υt πθrdsdυπi   

1
1
                    (A22) 
 
at steady state such that 0tg , 0tx , 0tc , and 0tk
  by equations (A2), (A10), 
and (A19). If the accelerating inflation rate is higher than the target rate of inflation, the central 
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bank can raise the nominal interest rate from 
tGt πθi   (equation [A22]) to 
 
ψπθi tGt   
 
by positive ψ by intervening in financial markets to lower the accelerating rate of inflation. In 
this case, the central bank keeps the initial target rate of inflation because it is truly independent. 
The government thus faces a rate of increase of real obligation that is higher than θG by the extra 
rate ψ.7 If the government lowers θG so that θG < θP and inflation stops accelerating, the central 
bank will accordingly reduce the extra rate ψ. If, however, the government does not 
accommodate θG to the target rate of inflation, the extra rate ψ will increase as time passes 
because of the gap between the accelerating inflation rate and the target rate of inflation widens 
by equation (A20) and γx in Taylor-type instrument rules is usually larger than unity, say 1.5. 
Because of the extra rate ψ, the government has no other way to achieve optimization unless it 
lowers θG to one that is consistent with the target rate of inflation. Once the government 
recognizes that the central bank is firmly determined to be independent and it is in vain to try to 
intervene in the central bank’s decision makings, the government would not dare to attempt to 
raise θG again anymore. 
 Equation (A20) implies that a government allows inflation to accelerate because it acts 
to maximize its expected utility based only on its own preferences. A government is hardly the 
only entity that cannot easily control its own preferences even when these preferences may 
result in unfavorable consequences. It may not even be possible to manipulate one’s own 
preferences at will. Thus, even though a government is fully rational and is not weak, foolish, or 
untruthful, it is difficult for it to self-regulate its preferences. Hence, an independent neutral 
organization is needed to help control θG. Delegating the authority to set and keep the target rate 
of inflation to an independent central bank is a way to control θG. The delegated independent 
central bank will control θG because it is not the central bank’s preference to stabilize the price 
level—it is simply a duty delegated to it. An independent central bank is not the only possible 
choice. For example, pegging the local currency with a foreign currency can be seen as a kind of 
delegation to an independent neutral organization. In addition, the gold standard that prevailed 
before World War II can be also seen as a type of such delegation. 
 Note also that the delegation may not be viewed as bad from the Leviathan 
government’s point of view because only its rate of time preference is changed, and the 
government can still pursue its political objectives. One criticism of the argument that central 
banks should be independent (e.g., Blinder 1998) is that, since the time-inconsistency problem 
argued in Kydland and Prescott (1977) or Barro and Gordon (1983) is more acute with fiscal 
policy, why is it not also necessary to delegate fiscal policies? An economically Leviathan 
government, however, will never allow fiscal policies to be delegated to an independent neutral 
organization because the Leviathan government would then not be able to pursue its political 
objectives, which in a sense would mean the death of the Leviathan government. The median 
household that backs the Leviathan government, but at the same time dislikes high inflation, 
will therefore support the delegation of authority but only if it concerns monetary policy. The 
independent central bank will then be given the authority to control θG and oblige the 
government to change θG in order to meet the target rate of inflation. 
 Without such a delegation of authority, it is likely that generally θG > θP because θG 
represents the median household whereas θP represents the mean household. Empirical studies 
indicate that the rate of time preference negatively correlates with permanent income (e.g., 
                                                          
7 The extra rate ψ affects not only the behavior of government but also that of the representative household, in which 
the conventional inflation theory is particularly interested. In this sense, the central bank’s instrument rule that 
concerns and simultaneously affects both behaviors of the government and the representative household is 
particularly important for price stability. 
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Lawrance 1991), and the permanent income of the median household is usually lower than that 
of the mean household. If generally θG > θP, that suggests that inflation will tend to accelerate 
unless a central bank is independent. The independence of the central bank is therefore very 
important in keeping the path of inflation stable. 
     Note also that the forced adjustments of θG by an independent central bank are exogenous 
shocks to both the government and the representative household because they are planned solely 
by the central bank. When a shock on θG is given, the government and the representative 
household must recalculate their optimal paths including the path of inflation by resetting θG, πt, 
and φ.     
 
A2  The multi-country model 
In this section, the single-country model shown in Section A1 is extended to a multi-country 
model in the framework of endogenous growth, in which there is more than one government but 
only one central bank. More concretely, the single-country model is extended by combining it 
with the multi-country endogenous growth model by Harashima (2010). In addition, some 
technical modifications are made to the extended model so that the economics of monetary 
union can be analyzed. 
 
A2.1  The optimization of households 
A2.1.1  The base model 
The production function is  tttt ,L,KAFY  , and the accumulation of capital is 
 
  
tttt AνCYK
   , 
 
where Yt is outputs, At is technology, Kt is capital inputs, Lt is labor inputs, Ct is consumption, 
 0ν  is a constant, and a unit of Kt and v-1 of a unit of At are equivalent: that is, they are 
produced using the same quantities of inputs. All firms are identical and have the same size, and 
for any period, 
 
t
t
L
M
μ   ,                              (A23) 
 
where Mt is the number of firms, and  0μ  is a constant. In addition,  
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thus,  
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                             (A25) 
 
is always kept, where yt is output per capita, kt is capital per capita, and  1  is a constant. 
For simplicity, the period of patent is assumed to be indefinite, and no capital depreciation is 
assumed.   indicates the effect of patent protection. With patents, the income is distributed to 
not only capitals and labors but technologies. Equation (A23) indicates that population and 
number of firms are positively correlated. Equations (A24) and (A25) indicate that returns on 
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investing in Kt and in At are kept equal and that a firm that produces a new technology cannot 
obtain all the returns on an investment in At. This means that investing in At increases Yt, but the 
investing firm’s return on the investment in At is only a fraction of the increase of Yt, such that 
   t
t
tt
t
t νA
Y
μLνA
Y
M 



 
 because of uncompensated knowledge spillovers to other firms 
and complementarity of technologies. 
 A part of the knowledge generated as a result of an investment made by a firm spills 
over to other firms. Researchers in firms as well as universities and research institutions could 
not effectively generate innovations if they were isolated from other researchers. They contact 
and stimulate each other. Probably, mutual partial knowledge spillovers among researchers and 
firms give each other reciprocal benefits. Researchers take hints on their researches in exchange 
for spilled knowledge. Therefore, even though the investing firm wishes to keep its knowledge 
secret, some parts of it will spill over. In addition, many uncompensated knowledge spillovers 
occur because many technologies are regarded as so minor that they are not applied for patents 
and left unprotected by patents. Nevertheless, even if a technology that was generated as a 
byproduct is completely useless for the investing firm, it may be a treasure for firms in a 
different industry. At includes all these technologies, and an investment in technology generates 
many technologies that the investing firm cannot protect by patents.  
 Broadly speaking, there are two types of uncompensated knowledge spillovers: 
intra-sectoral knowledge spillovers (i.e., Marshall-Arrow-Romer [MAR] externalities; Marshall, 
1890; Arrow, 1962; Romer, 1986) and inter-sectoral knowledge spillovers (i.e., Jacobs 
externalities; Jacobs, 1969). MAR theory assumes that knowledge spillovers between 
homogenous firms work out most effectively and that spillovers will therefore primarily emerge 
within one sector. As a result, uncompensated knowledge spillovers will be more active if the 
number of firms within a sector is larger. On the other hand, Jacobs (1969) argues that 
knowledge spillovers are most effective among firms that practice different activities and that 
diversification (i.e., a variety of sectors) is important for spillovers. As a result, uncompensated 
knowledge spillovers will be more active if the number of sectors in the economy is larger. 
Nevertheless, if all sectors have the same number of firms, an increase in the number of firms in 
the economy results in more active knowledge spillovers in any case, owing to either MAR 
externalities or Jacobs externalities. 
 Furthermore, as the volume of uncompensated knowledge spillovers increases, the 
investing firm’s returns on the investment in At decrease. 
t
t
A
Y


 indicates the total increase in Yt 
in the economy by an increase in At, which consists of increases in both outputs in the firm that 
invested in the new technologies and outputs in other firms that utilize the newly invented 
technologies, whether the firms obtained the technologies by compensating the originating firm 
or by using uncompensated knowledge spillovers. If the number of firms becomes larger and 
uncompensated knowledge spillovers occur more actively, the compensated fraction in 
t
t
A
Y


 
that the investing firm can obtain becomes smaller, and the investing firm’s returns on the 
investment in At also become smaller. 
 Complementarity of technologies also reduces the fraction of 
t
t
A
Y


 that the investing 
firm can obtain. If a new technology is effective only if it is combined with some particular 
technologies, the return on the investment in technology will belong not only to the investing 
firm but to the firms that hold these particular technologies. For example, an innovation in 
software technology generated by a software company increases the sales and profits of 
computer hardware companies. The economy’s productivity increases because of the innovation 
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but the increased incomes are attributed not only to the firm that generated the innovation but 
also to the firms that hold complementary technologies. A part of 
t
t
A
Y


 leaks to these firms. For 
them, the leaked income is a kind of rent revenue unexpectedly become obtainable thanks to the 
innovation. Most new technologies will have complementary technologies. In addition, as the 
number of firms increases, the number of firms that holds complementary technologies will also 
increase, and thereby these leaks will also increase.  
 Because of the uncompensated knowledge spillovers and the complementarity of 
technologies, therefore, the fraction of 
t
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A
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

 that an investing firm can obtain on average will 
be comparatively small, i.e.,   will be far smaller than Mt except that Mt is very small,
8
 and 
the fraction will decrease as Mt increases.  
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A2.1.2  Models with heterogeneous households 
Three heterogeneities―heterogeneous time preference, risk aversion, and productivity―are 
examined in endogenous growth models, which are modified versions of the model shown in 
Section A2.1.1. First, suppose that there are two economies― economy 1 and economy 2—that 
are identical except for time preference, risk aversion, or productivity. The population growth 
rate is zero (i.e., 0tn ). The economies are fully open to each other, and goods, services, and 
capital are freely transacted between them, but labor is immobilized in each economy. Note that 
the two-country models shown in this section can be extended to include numerous economies 
that have differing degrees of heterogeneity, which will be constructed in Section A2.2. 
 
A2.1.2.1  Heterogeneous time preference model 
First, a model in which the two economies are identical except for time preference is 
constructed. The rate of time preference of the representative household in economy 1 is θP,1 
and that in economy 2 is θP,2, and 2,1, PP θθ  . The production function in economy 1 is 
 t
α
tt kfAy ,1,1   and that in economy 2 is  t
α
tt kfAy ,2,2  , where yρ,t and kρ,t are, respectively, 
output and capital per capita in economy ρ in period t for ρ = 1, 2. The population of each 
economy is 
2
tL ; thus, the total for both is Lt, which is sufficiently large. Firms operate in both 
economies, and the number of firms is Mt. The current account balance in economy 1 is τt and 
                                                          
8 If Mt is very small, the value of   will be far smaller than that for sufficiently large Mt, because the number of 
firms that can benefit from an innovation is constrained owing to very small Mt. The very small number of firms 
indicates that the economy is not sufficiently sophisticated, and thereby the benefit of an innovation can not be fully 
realized in the economy. This constraint can be modeled as   tM1~11~     where  1~   is a constant. 
Nevertheless, for sufficiently large Mt (i.e., in sufficiently sophisticated economies), the constraint is removed such 
that      

~~11~lim 1
t
t
M
M
. 
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that in economy 2 is 
tτ . Because a balanced growth path requires Harrod neutral 
technological progress, the production functions are further specified as  
 
  α
tρ,
α
tρ,t kAy
 1  ; 
 
thus,    211 ,ρLAKY αttαρ,tρ,t   . 
 Because both economies are fully open, returns on investments in each economy are 
kept equal through arbitration such that  
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Equation (A26) indicates that an increase in At enhances outputs in both economies such that 
 
 t
,t,t
ti,t
i,t
νA
YY
MK
Y




 21 , and because the population is equal (
2
tL ), 





i,t
i,t
i,t
i,t
k
y
K
Y
 
 
 
 
 
 
t
,t,tt
t
,t,t
tt
,t,t
t A
yy
μv
L
νA
yy
μLνA
YY
M 






 212121
22

. Therefore, 
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Because equation (A26) is always held through arbitration, equations 
tt kk ,2,1  , tt kk ,2,1
  , 
tt yy ,2,1   and tt yy ,2,1    are also held. Hence, 
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In addition, because 
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 through arbitration, then 
tt AA ,2,1
   is 
held. 
 The accumulated current account balance dsτ
t
s0  mirrors capital flows between the 
two economies. The economy with current account surpluses invests them in the other economy. 
Since 


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
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,1  are returns on investments, dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t


0
,1
,1  and dsτ
k
y t
s
t
t


0
,2
,2  represent 
income receipts or payments on the assets that an economy owns in the other economy. Hence,  
 
dsτ
k
y
τ
t
s
t
t
t 
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
0
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,2  
 
is the balance on goods and services of economy 1, and  
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t
t
s
t
t τdsτ
k
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

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,1
,1  
 
is that of economy 2. Because the current account balance mirrors capital flows between the 
economies, the balance is a function of capital in both economies such that  
 
   ,t,tt ,kkgτ 21  . 
 
 The representative household in economy 1 maximizes its expected utility 
 
     dttθcuE Pt 1,
0
,11 exp 

 , 
 
subject to 
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and the representative household in economy 2 maximizes its expected utility 
 
     dttθcuE P,,t 2
0
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subject to 
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where uρ,t, cρ,t, and ρ,tA
 , respectively, are the utility function, per capita consumption, and the 
increase in At by R&D activities in economy ρ in period t for ρ = 1, 2; E is the expectation 
operator; and 
ttt AAA ,2,1
  . Equations (A27) and (A28) implicitly assume that each 
economy does not have foreign assets or debt in period t = 0. 
 Because the production function is Harrod neutral and because 
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Because Lt is sufficiently large and   is far smaller than Mt, the problem of scale effects 
vanishes and thereby 
 
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.  
 Putting the above elements together, the optimization problem of economy 1 can be 
rewritten as  
 
     dttθcuEMax P,t 1,
0
11 exp 
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subject to 
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Similarly, that of economy 2 can be rewritten as 
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subject to 
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A2.1.2.2  Heterogeneous risk aversion model 
The basic structure of the model with heterogeneous risk aversion is the same as that of 
heterogeneous time preference. The two economies are identical except in regard to risk 
aversion. The degree of relative risk aversion of economy 1 is 
'u
"uc
ε
,t
1
11
1   and that of 
economy 2 is 
'u
"uc
ε
,t
2
22
2  , which are constant, and 21 εε  . The optimization problem of 
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economy 1 is 
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subject to 
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and that of economy 2 is 
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subject to 
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A2.1.2.3  Heterogeneous productivity model 
With heterogeneous productivity, the production function is heterogeneous, not the utility 
function. Because technology At is common to both economies, a heterogeneous production 
function requires heterogeneity in elements other than technology. Prescott (1998) argues that 
unknown factors other than technology have made total factor productivity (TFP) heterogeneous 
across countries. Harashima (2009) argues that average workers’ innovative activities are an 
essential element of productivity and make TFP heterogeneous across workers, firms, and 
economies. Since average workers are human and capable of creative intellectual activities, they 
can create innovations even if their innovations are minor. It is rational for firms to exploit all 
the opportunities that these ordinary workers’ innovative activities offer. Furthermore, 
innovations created by ordinary workers are indispensable for efficient production. A 
production function incorporating average workers’ innovations has been shown to have a 
Cobb-Douglas functional form with a labor share of about 70% (Harashima 2009), such that 
 
α
t
α
t
α
tLAt LKAωωσY
 1  ,                       (A29) 
 
where ωA and ωL are positive constant parameters with regard to average workers’ creative 
activities, and σ  is a parameter that represents a worker’s accessibility limit to capital with 
regard to location. The parameters ωA and ωL are independent of At but are dependent on the 
creative activities of average workers. Thereby, unlike with technology At, these parameters can 
be heterogeneous across workers, firms, and economies. 
 In this model of heterogeneous productivity, it is assumed that workers whose 
households belong to different economies have different values of ωA and ωL. In addition, only 
productivity that is represented by α
tLA Aωωσ  in equation (A29) is heterogeneous between the 
two economies. The production function of economy 1 is  ,t
α
t
α
,t kfAωy 111   and that of 
economy 2 is  ,t
α
t
α
,t kfAωy 222  , where  10 11 ωω  and  10 22 ωω  are constants and 
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12 ωω  . Since 
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Because equation (A26) is always held through arbitration, equations 
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 Because Lt is sufficiently large and   is far smaller than Mt and thus 
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and similarly, that of economy 2 is 
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A2.1.3  Sustainable heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity is defined as being sustainable if all the optimality conditions of all 
heterogeneous households are satisfied indefinitely. The nature of sustainable heterogeneity is 
examined in a multi-country model of heterogeneous time preference, risk aversion and 
productivity, which is constructed by combining the three models in the previous section (see 
Harashima, 2010).  
 Suppose that there are N economies with identical population, and let 
ρ,ς,tτ  be the 
current account balance of economy ρ with economy ς, where ρ = 1, 2, … , N, ς = 1, 2, … , N, 
and ρ ≠ ς.  
 
Proposition: If and only if  
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for any ρ (= 1, 2, … , N), all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous economies are 
satisfied at steady state such that 
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for any ρ and ς (ρ ≠ ς).  
Proof: See Harashima (2010). 
 
On the balanced growth path satisfying the condition shown in Proposition, heterogeneities in 
time preference, risk aversion and productivity are sustainable by definition because all the 
optimality conditions of the two economies are indefinitely satisfied. Economies that keep 
sustainable heterogeneity constitute a combined economy with productivity α
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 of the representative household. The nature of sustainable heterogeneity 
is examined more in detail in Harashima (2010). 
 
A2.2  The law of motion for inflation in the multi-country 
endogenous growth model 
A2.2.1  The monetary union 
Suppose that there is a monetary union that consists of N member states and one currency.  
There is no federal government in the monetary union, and fiscal policies are therefore 
implemented separately by each member. Monetary policies are unified and implemented only 
by the central bank of the monetary union, which is sufficiently independent of the member 
states. For simplicity, population in each member state is assumed to be identical and constant, 
and the total population in the monetary union is sufficiently large. Sustainable heterogeneity, as 
shown in Section A2.1.3, is kept. The time preference rate of the representative household in 
member state ρ is θP,ρ for ρ = 1, 2, …, N. The time preference rate of the government of member 
state ρ is θG,ρ and θG,ρ > θP,ρ. Suppose for simplicity that 
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 are positive and constant, similar to the 
degree of relative risk aversion of households. εg and εx are, respectively, identical across 
member governments, such that 
gg,ρ εε   and xx,ρ εε   for any ρ. 
 As shown in Section A2.1.3, economies that keep sustainable heterogeneity constitute 
a combined economy with productivity α
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household. The combined economy grows at the constant rate 
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(equation [A31]) where ct is the consumption of the representative household of the monetary 
union. Because sustainable heterogeneity is kept in the monetary union, the time preference rate 
of the representative household of the monetary union is 
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the size of an economy in the monetary union is measured by the productivity differential 
parameter ωρ, the integrated time preference rate of government in the monetary union is 
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. The overall rate of inflation in the monetary union is πt. The 
central bank of the monetary union sets θG equal to θP so that πt will not accelerate.   
 Because  
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across the monetary union, where yt, kt, and rt are the per capita outputs, per capita capital inputs, 
and the real interest rate in the monetary union, respectively, and r  is a constant. By equation 
(A9), 
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in the monetary union. By equations (A31), (A32), and (A33),  
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if sustainable heterogeneity is kept. 
 
A2.2.2  The law of motion for inflation 
Each member government maximizes its expected utility subject to constraints. However, unlike 
the single-country model, the constraint is not limited to equation (A3). The real current account 
balance (ηρ,t) within the monetary union in each member state must be stable at steady state; 
thus,  
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because the economy of the monetary union otherwise eventually collapses. As will be 
discussed in Section 4.2.4, current account balances depend on inflation differentials; thereby, 
ηρ,t is a function of π1,t,π2,t,  …, πN,t and thus a function of θG,1,t,θG,2,t,  …, θG,N,t and θP, such 
that   
 
   PN , tG,tG,tGi,t ,...,,hη  ,,2,1,  ,  
 
where πρ,t is the rate of inflation in member state ρ. Each member government therefore 
maximizes its expected utility subject to not only equation (A3) but also equation (A35). 
 By equations (A18), (A32) and (A34), the law of motion for inflation is  
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Therefore, if 
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for any ρ, inflation does not accelerate in the monetary union (i.e., 0tπ ). Because 
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, equation (A36) indicates that, unlike the exogenous growth model 
shown in Section A1 in which inflation does not accelerate if 
pG θθ  , inflation does not 
accelerate in the framework of endogenous growth if 
pG θθ  . 
 However, an additional element in the behavior of government should also be 
considered in the framework of endogenous growth. Unlike the exogenous growth model, the 
economy grows at a constant rate in the endogenous growth model. As yt increases, xt and gt will 
not remain at the same level as before because, as the economy grows, the capability of the 
government to collect and spend money also increases. Conversely, as the economy grows, the 
utility obtained by spending a unit of gt and disutility generated by imposing a unit of xt 
decrease. Considering this scale effect, the utility function of government is replaced with 
 
   ρ,tρ,tρ,tG,ρ ,yx,gu  . 
 
Notice that yρ,t is exogenous for the government, although it is endogenous for households. The 
constant endogenous growth of yρ,t is perceived by the government as successive exogenous 
shocks on yρ,t in  ρ,tρ,tρ,tG,ρ ,yx,gu . When an exogenous upward shock of yρ,t occurs, larger gρ,t 
and xρ,t are optimal for the government because of the scale effect; thus, gρ,t and xρ,t begin to 
increase on the transition path to the new steady state. The government perceives that 
exogenous shocks on yρ,t continuously occur because of the constant endogenous growth of yρ,t; 
thereby, gρ,t and xρ,t continuously move to new transition paths. Because  G,ρ
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on transition paths, and because 0g,ρε  and 0x,ρε , then by equations (A32) and (A34), if 
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is always satisfied for any ρ, inflation does not accelerate where Ω is a positive variable. Hence, 
if 
  P
α
N
q
q
θ
αvNμ
ωα
Ω 
















1
1

, then when the central bank of the monetary union keeps 
pG θθ  , inflation does not accelerate even in the framework of endogenous growth.  
 
A3  THE EURO’S FLAW  
A3.1  The basic structure 
The euro is examined in this section using the model of monetary union constructed in Section 3. 
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For simplicity, the degree of relative risk aversion of the representative household is assumed to 
be identical in all euro member states. Productivity and the time preference rate of the 
representative household, however, are assumed to be heterogeneous across member states. The 
productivity differential parameter in member state ρ (ωρ) is given exogenously and is constant 
for any ρ. The time preference rate of the representative household in member state ρ is θP,ρ and 
is inversely correlated to the productivity differential parameter ωρ (see, e.g., Lawrance, 1991; 
Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003). The integrated time preference rate of the representative 
household of all member states is 
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. The intrinsic time preference 
rate of the government of member state ρ is 
G,ρθ  and G,ρθ > θP,ρ. The actual time preference 
rate of the government of member state ρ in period t is θG,ρ,t, and it is time variable because of 
control by the ECB. The integrated actual time preference rate of all member governments in 
period t is 
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effect shown in Section 3.2.2, 
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 is always satisfied. Hence, the ECB 
needs to set θG,t equal to θP not to accelerate the overall rate of inflation in the euro area. 
Because θG,t = θP is kept by the ECB, each government is expected to adjust its time preference 
rate θG,ρ,t equal to θP. If a government does not sufficiently adjust its θG,ρ,t and sets θG,ρ,t > θP, it 
deviates from the expected behavior; such behavior is called a “deviation” hereafter.  
 
A3.2  Factors that generate the flaw 
A3.2.1  Adhering to own preferences 
The law of motion for inflation shown in equation (A20) indicates that inflation does not 
accelerate because a government acts in a stupid, foolish, or irrational manner, but rather 
because it behaves quite normally—it adheres to its intrinsic time preference unless an 
independent neutral institution (i.e., a central bank) forces it to stop doing so. However, a 
fundamental question arises. Even if the government is acting quite normally, is this behavior 
rational? In economics, rationality usually means that, given the available information, optimal 
decisions to achieve an objective are taken and rational behavior is generally assumed. However, 
can rational behavior still prevail when a government cannot optimize its behavior to achieve its 
objective? This special situation emerges if the central bank is perfectly independent and is 
firmly determined to stabilize inflation and if, at the same time, the intrinsic time preference rate 
of government is unchangeable. In this situation, the economy will destabilize and eventually 
collapse as shown in Section 2. Therefore, the government cannot achieve its objective (i.e., 
cannot maximize its expected utility) and can only behave irrationally in this case. Conversely, 
if the government wants to optimize its objective and behave rationally, it must change its time 
preference. Clearly, trade-offs between rationality and time preference exist in some situations, 
and either rationality or time preference must be endogenized.  
 Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that people will not optimize their behavior to meet 
their objectives (i.e., maximize utility) if they have complete knowledge of the optimal path. 
Hence, rationality should prevail over preferences, and time preference will be endogenized 
when a clash between rationality and time preference occurs. If time preference is endogenized, 
rational decisions become possible.  
 Even though rationality should eventually prevail over preferences, governments will 
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not easily change their own preferences. They will resist endogenizing them and search for 
options to escape from doing so—it is this stubborn nature that drives governments to deviate 
from the path specified by the ECB. Section 2 indicated that the inflation problem is equivalent 
to the deviation problem. The mechanism of inflation differentials in the euro area, therefore, 
must be fully examined considering this driving force of deviation.   
 Even though unfavorable consequences are expected if no change is made, it can be 
very difficult to change one’s own preferences alone. Controlling preferences therefore usually 
requires the help of other people or institutions, which is one of the reasons why independent 
central banks were established to stabilize inflation. Nevertheless, as will be examined in the 
following sections, the question arises whether the ECB can fully control each member 
government’s desire to adhere to its own time preference rate.  
 
A3.2.2  The limited capability of the ECB 
The ECB faces a problem that most other central banks do not face. There are an infinite 
number of combinations of θG,ρ,t that satisfy P
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cannot force its member governments to select the combination that it wants them to select. That 
is, the ECB cannot separately control θG,ρ,t, only θG,t collectively.  
 As shown in Section 2.2, the central bank in the single-country model punishes the 
government’s deviation by raising the nominal interest rate such that ψπθi tG,tt  . Equation 
ttG,t πiθ   (equation [A22]) is not satisfied until the government obeys the central bank and 
lowers θG,t. However, the ECB cannot effectively impose ψ separately on each member state; 
thereby, equation 
ρ,tρ,ttG,ρ, πiθ   can be satisfied in a member state even though tG,ρ,θ  
PG,t θθ  . Even if a government behaves based on its own G,ρθ  that is different from θP, the 
ECB can neither punish nor force the government to transition to 
PG,ttG,ρ, θθθ  . As a result, 
the combination of θG,ρ,t is not selected only by the ECB but rather through conflict, negotiation, 
and cooperation among the member governments. Thereby, the possibility exists that, at the 
same time, 
Pρ,tG, θθ   for some member states and Pρ,tG, θ  for others and PG,t θθ   is kept. 
Unlike most other central banks, independence is not sufficient for the ECB to fully stabilize 
inflation. 
 
A3.2.3  Diverse inflation rates owing to non-tradability 
Because all member states use the same currency, the price level would be identical across the 
euro area by arbitrage if all goods and services were traded freely inside the euro area. However, 
not all goods and services are tradable. If anything, the share of non-tradable goods and services 
in the euro area is large (e.g., Altissimo et al., 2005). Unlike tradable goods and services, the 
prices of non-tradable goods and services are not equalized by arbitrage. This price 
heterogeneity indicates that the rate of inflation in each member state can also be heterogeneous, 
and heterogeneous inflation indicates that governments may deviate from the path the ECB sets, 
at least temporarily. Member governments may enjoy periods when they behave based on their 
own intrinsic 
G,ρθ that is higher than PG,t θθ  .  
 Note that even though inflation is heterogeneous, the marginal product of capital in 
every industry in every member state is kept identical by arbitrage; that is, 
P
ρ,t
ρ,t
θ
k
y



, because 
capital flows freely within the euro area.  
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A3.2.4  Current account imbalances owing to inflation differentials 
Inflation differentials will lead to current account imbalances (e.g., Blanchard, 2007; Arghyrou 
and Chortareas, 2008; EC, 2009). Although inflation rates diverge among the member states, the 
prices of tradable goods and services are still generally equalized across the euro area by 
arbitrage. The equalization is realized by outflows of cheaper tradable goods and services from 
member states with lower inflation member states to the states with higher inflation. The 
inflowing goods and services eventually will need to be purchased with money from the 
exporting member states (lower inflation states) because the importing states (higher inflation 
states) are not obtaining money by exporting either their higher priced tradable goods or their 
non-tradable goods and services. A large part of borrowed money, therefore, is used not for 
investment but for consumption in the higher inflation member states. As a result, the trade and 
current account balances in member states with higher inflation will show continuous deficits.  
 
A3.3  The mechanism of the flaw 
A3.3.1  The utility functional 
Considering the conflict between rationality and preference, the government’s utility function 
 ρ,tρ,tG,ρ x,gu  is extended to the functional consisting of the utility function  ρ,tρ,tG,ρ x,gu  and 
a variable 
tG,ρ,θ
~
 such that  
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where 
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~
.
9
 The government has a strong desire to behave based on its intrinsic 
time preference rate but it has to change its rate for it to behave rationally under the control of 
the ECB. 
tG,ρ,θ
~
 represents the gap between the reality (θG,ρ,t) and the desire ( G,ρθ ). For 
simplicity, only the case 0
~
tG,ρ,θ  is examined. The functional has the following properties: 
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The more θG,ρ,t is forced to decrease, the more utility decreases, but the magnitude of the 
decrease diminishes as the scale of the forced decrease increases. As a whole, each member 
government maximizes its expected utility 
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subject to equations (A3) and (A35). In addition, the ECB always keeps 
PG,t θθ   for any t, by 
which θG,ρ,t is endogenized.  
  If there is an inflation differential, equation (A35) cannot be satisfied. Hence, a 
necessary condition for satisfying equation (A35) is 
PG,ttρ,G, θθθ   for any ρ, and an 
indefinite deviation is therefore impossible. Although an indefinite deviation is impossible, 
temporary and intermittent deviations may be possible. However, because of equation (A35) 
and 
PG,t θθ  , deviations necessitate future corrections. Because deviations increase current 
                                                          
9 The utility function of government is  ρ,tρ,tρ,tG,ρ ,yx,gu  if the scale effect shown in Section 3.2.2 is explicitly 
considered. However, for simplicity, the scale effect is made implicit and  ρ,tρ,tG,ρ x,gu  is used. 
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account deficits and, consequently, external debt burdens (see Section A3.2.4), θG,ρ,t must be 
made temporarily lower than θP in some future periods to decrease πρ,t and external debt burdens 
before current account imbalances can stabilize (i.e., before 
PG,tG,ρ,ρ θθθ   for any ρ is 
achieved). If the utility gains resulting from a temporary deviation exceed the discounted sum of 
disutility caused by the future correction of the deviation, the deviation will be selected as a 
rational choice.  
 Note that if a member government temporarily behaves based on a θG,ρ,t that is higher 
than 
PtG, θθ  , then at least one of the other member states has to set its θG,ρ below θG,t during 
the deviating period because the ECB keeps 
PtG, θθ  . 
 
A3.3.2  Rational deviations 
 Suppose that a member government deviates by discontinuously increasing (hereafter 
“jumping”) its θG,ρ,t from the ECB’s target rate ( PtG, θθ  ) to  PG,ρ θθ   and keeping it until  
1tt  . The government corrects the deviation after t1 by jumping θG,ρ,t downwards to  PG,ρ θθ ˆ  
and keeping it there during 
21 ttt  . After t2, the government keeps PtG,tG,ρ, θθθ  . Hence, 
the government’s expected utility when it deviates and later corrects the deviation is 
 
        dttθ,x,guuEΛ G,ρ
t
ρ,tρtG,ρG,ρD   exp0
~1
0
 
              dttθθθ,x,guudttθE G,ρ
t
t
G,ρG,ρρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρ
t
G,ρ
ˆexpˆ~exp
2
1
1
0
   
                dttθθθ,x,guudttθdttθE G,t
t
G,tG,ρρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρ
t
t
G,ρ
t
G,ρ  

exp~ˆexpexp
2
2
1
1
0
 . 
 
Here, if the government does not deviate, its expected utility is  
 
      dttθθθ,x,guuEΛ G,tG,tG,ρρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρN  

exp~
0
 . 
 
Hence, 
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t
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exp~ˆexpexp
2
2
1
1
0
  
                  dtθθθ,x,guudtθE G,t
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G,t  

exp~exp
2
2
0
.          (A38) 
 
Let Λ1, Λ2, …, Λ6 be the first, second, …, sixth terms of the right side of equation (A38), 
respectively. 
21 ΛΛ   indicates the utility gain owing to the deviation, and 43 ΛΛ   indicates 
the utility loss owing to the future correction. 065  ΛΛ  and 4321 ΛΛΛΛΛΛ ND   
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because       0expˆexpexp 22
1
1
00
  dtθdttθdttθ
t
G,t
t
t
G,ρ
t
G,ρ
. 
 If the correction is implemented in a far shorter period than the deviating period and 
thus the scale of correction in each period is far larger than the scale of deviation in each period, 
then  4321 ΛΛΛΛ   because 
  
0~
~~
2
2



tG,ρ,
tG,ρ,ρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρ
θ
θ,x,guu
 and of the effect of the 
discount factor. Hence, if 
  
2
2
~
~~
tG,ρ,
tG,ρ,ρ,tρ,tG,ρG,ρ
θ
θ,x,guu


 is sufficiently large, 0 ND ΛΛ ; that is, 
the expected utility gains owing to the early deviation will exceed the discounted sum of the 
expected utility losses resulting from the future correction. This means that a government will 
rationally choose to deviate. Therefore, in a euro-type monetary union in which the central bank 
has only limited enforcement power, substantial deviations of member governments will happen 
and be left unchecked for a relatively long period. 
 Notice that deviation paths are not limited to the type shown above. It was assumed in 
the above examination that the correction is taken just after the deviation ends. However, it is 
possible to postpone the correction to the far future. During the period between the deviation 
and the postponed corrections, 
PtG,tG,ρ, θθθ   is kept. 
 
A3.3.3  Inflation differentials  
By the law of motion for inflation, inflation will temporarily accelerate in the deviating member 
state even though overall inflation in the euro area does not accelerate because of ECB control. 
Because the deviations should be temporary, inflation acceleration will be small scale, but 
non-negligible inflation differentials will be observed. If the correction is postponed to far future 
periods after the deviation ends, 
PtG,tG,ρ, θθθ   is kept and inflation does not accelerate 
during the interim period. However, because the deviation is left uncorrected, the relatively high 
rate of inflation continues in the deviating member state by the law of motion for inflation, and 
the inflation differentials thereby continue during this period. In addition, because the scale of 
deviation increases as the government’s intrinsic time preference rate (
G,ρθ ) increases and the 
rate of time preference is empirically inversely correlated to productivity (see, e.g., Lawrance, 
1991; Samwick, 1998; Ventura, 2003), relatively less productive member states (that have a 
relatively higher intrinsic time preference rate) will experience larger scale deviations and 
consequently higher inflation than relatively more productive member states. These features of 
inflation differentials predicted by the model are basically consistent with the observed 
persistent inflation differentials in the euro area. 
 
A3.3.4  Fiscal deficits 
When θG,ρ,t jumps upwards, the government’s fiscal balance and debts are governed by non-liner 
complex processes. For simplicity, these processes are examined here based on the exogenous 
growth model used in Section 2. The thick solid line in Figure 1 indicates the steady state values 
of 
ρ,t
ρ,tρ,tρ,t
b
gx 
 corresponding to those of 
ρ,tρ,t πi  . Suppose that the economy is first at 
steady state (point E in Figure 1). Then, by the upwards jump of θG,ρ,t, the steady state moves 
from E to E
~
. Because of the steady state shift, 
ρ,t
ρ,tρ,tρ,t
b
gx 
 jumps downwards from E to 
J and then moves upwards on the transition path to E
~
 (along the thick dotted line in Figure 1). 
Accordingly, gρ,t and xρ,t jump to their transition paths and proceed on them to the new steady 
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state. Note that, because seigniorage (φρ,t) plays a limited role in modern economies, it is 
assumed here for simplicity that 0
ρ,t
ρ,t


 even after the jump.  
 By equations (A14), (A16) and (A17),  
 
ρ,t
ρ,tρ,tρ,t
tG,ρ,
b
gx
θ

                           (A39) 
 
at any steady state (see Harashima, 2006, 2008). Hence, the upwards jump of θG,ρ,t requires a 
decrease of steady state bρ,t and/or an increase of steady state ρ,tρ,t gx   to satisfy equation 
(A39). Because both an increase of steady state xρ,t and a decrease of steady state gρ,t reduce the 
utility at steady state, the steady state bρ,t is expected to decrease to satisfy equation (A39). 
Hence, the government’s real debts bρ,t are smaller at the new steady state E
~
 than at the 
previous steady state E. Note that the level of bρ,t is not determined only by equation (A39) but 
also by the initial level of bρ,t and exogenous shocks on bρ,t (e.g., discretionary fiscal policies in 
case of a recession).  
 Because bρ,t is a stock variable and cannot move drastically and discontinuously, 
ρ,tρ,t gx   (not bρ,t) jumps downward substantially as 
ρ,t
ρ,tρ,tρ,t
b
gx 
 jumps downward to J. 
Here, 
ρ,t
ρ,tρ,tρ,t
ρ,tρ,t
ρ,t
ρ,t
b
gx
πi
b
b 


 by equation (A1). In addition, πρ,t and iρ,t cannot jump 
and remain at almost the same values just after the jump by the law of motion for inflation. 
Therefore, if the downward jump of 
ρ,tρ,t gx   is sufficiently large, 0
ρ,t
ρ,t
b
b
 and the fiscal 
balance (
ρ,tb
 ) shows deficits initially after the jump. However, as bρ,t gradually increases 
because of the fiscal deficits, 
ρ,tρ,t gx   also gradually increases but more rapidly than bρ,t to 
satisfy equation (A39) (i.e., 
ρ,t
ρ,tρ,tρ,t
b
gx 
 gradually increases on the transition path from J 
to E
~
 in Figure 1), and after a certain period, fiscal deficits turn to surpluses. The government’s 
real debts bρ,t that initially increased after the jump eventually then start to decrease and move to 
a lower level than the previous steady state bρ,t at E (Figure 2). The fiscal balance and 
government debt after the jump therefore are governed by non-linear complex processes. If the 
deviation is not a single jump but intermittently repeated, the process of fiscal balance will 
become substantially more complex. 
 The amount by which fiscal deficits initially increase depends on the values of εg,ρ and 
εx,ρ and other conditions, including the scale of deviation. The values of εg,ρ and εx,ρ will be 
heterogeneous among the member states, similar to θG,ρ,t, and the scale of deviation will be also 
heterogeneous. Therefore, fiscal balances after deviations will be governed by different 
processes across the member states. The features of non-linearity, complexity, and heterogeneity 
indicate that the SGP requirement that budget deficits of less than 3% of GDP are allowable 
whereas those over 3% must be punished in any period for any member state may not be 
reasonable. These features suggest that focusing only on fiscal deficits and setting an inflexible 
and non-country-specific ceiling on fiscal deficits and debts are not necessarily an appropriate 
way to prevent deviations. 
 
A3.3.5  Current account deficits  
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As discussed in Section A3.2.3, although inflation diverges among the member states owing to 
deviations, the prices of tradable goods and services are still equalized generally across the euro 
area by arbitrage. As a result, the trade and current account balances in the deviating member 
state will show continuous deficits. Accordingly, relatively less competitive firms producing 
tradable goods or services in deviating member states will disappear more rapidly because of the 
price differentials and the inflows of foreign goods and services. Industries of tradable goods 
and services will decline and the share of non-tradable goods and services industries will 
increase in deviating member states. The features of current account imbalances predicted by 
the model are basically consistent with the observed current account imbalances in the euro 
area.  
 If floating exchange rates were working, current account imbalances would be 
adjusted substantially through currency depreciation in deviating member states, but there is no 
such mechanism within the euro area. As a result, external debts of the deviating member states 
will accumulate continuously until the distortion caused by the deviation is corrected. The 
accumulation of external debts may not immediately threaten the euro. However, as more 
external debts accumulate, the economies of the deviating member states will become more 
vulnerable to various shocks, and because the member states’ economies are closely linked, the 
entire economy of the euro area also becomes more vulnerable to various shocks.  
 
A3.4  Comparison with a currency peg 
A foreign currency peg is similar to the situation with the euro because, in essence, more than 
one state uses the same currency. However, there is a fundamental difference between these 
situations. In the case of a currency peg, there are not only multiple governments but also 
multiple central banks. Hence, the central bank can directly control its government’s behavior in 
each country. Nevertheless, the fixed exchange ratio can only be maintained if inflation is 
stabilized in the pegging and pegged countries. The fixed exchange rate is not automatically 
kept—it is the result of work to stabilize inflation in both countries. The exchange rate will soon 
destabilize if the efforts to stabilize inflation are relaxed. Central banks in countries adopting a 
currency peg need to be sufficiently independent or the peg cannot be maintained. This is one 
reason why a currency peg is usually introduced as a tool to stabilize ongoing high inflation in 
pegging countries.  
 On the other hand, the euro unconditionally guarantees the same value across member 
states regardless of efforts to stabilize inflation in each state. Combining central banks deprives 
the incentive to and removes the tool to locally stabilize inflation. It may have been presumed 
that, if the overall inflation in the euro area is stabilized, local inflation will also naturally 
stabilize even though member governments are heterogeneous and independent. However, as 
shown in the previous sections, local inflation can be differentiated if governments are 
heterogeneous and independent. 
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Figure 1  The transition path after the jump of θG,ρ 
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Figure 2  The government’s real debts after the jump of θG,ρ 
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